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INEQUALITY IN THE LEGAL ORDER: 
SOME FURTHER ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 
WILLIAM C. BAILEY 
Cleveland State University 
I challenge David Jacobs' support for the conflict model of the legal order, finding 
serious limitations in his cross-sectional test of the model. To avoid these limitations 
and to extend the scope of Jacobs' study, I (1) apply his model to four additional crimes 
against persons and property; (2) examine race as an additional dimension of social ine- 
quality; and (3) consider how levels of crime might influence imprisonment ratios, a fac- 
tor Jacobs ignored. I find no support for the hypothesis that race is a significant deter- 
minant of state imprisonment practices. Nor do I find income inequality a significant 
factor in imprisonment for crimes against persons and property, except in the case of 
larceny. 
In "Inequality and the legal order: An ecological test of the conflict model," David Jacobs 
(1978) hypothesizes that "the more there are differences in economic resources and economic 
power, the more one can expect that the criminal codes will be administered in a way that pleases 
monied elites." Specifically, violators of property crimes are more likely to be punished where 
economic power and resources are distributed unequally. Jacobs emphasizes the importance of 
economic inequality because "as long as money almost automatically confers power in western 
society . . its unequal distribution ought to lead to outcomes preferred by the rich." He also em- 
phasizes the punishment of property crimes because "one major guarantee of the supremacy of 
an economic elite is property," and it stands to reason that the authorities will "make greater ef- 
forts to insure that violators of the property codes are sanctioned" (1978:516). 
Jacobs examined the relationship between income inequality and state imprisonment ratios for 
burglary and larceny using cross-sectional data for 1960. He introduced four other variables into 
the analysis to control for spuriousness of the relationship between income inequality and certain- 
ty of imprisonment: (1) the percentage of residents living in large cities; (2) percent change in the 
population from 1950 to 1960; (3) police per capita; and (4) resource level-mean income. His 
analysis of 47 states revealed a significant positive relationship between income inequality and im- 
prisonment ratios for both burglary and larceny, with income inequality being the best predictor 
of imprisonment. When only non-southern states were considered (n = 35), however, this pat- 
tern was altered somewhat for burglary. Jacobs argues that the non-significant findings for 
burglary for these states are not inconsistent with the conflict hypothesis, since "victimization 
data indicate that groups with less money are the most frequent victims of this crime in non- 
southern areas" (1978:521, author's emphasis). That is, "differences in economic advantage and 
power only predict imprisonment ratios for a crime of which a disproportionate number of vic- 
tims are affluent" (1978:522). 
THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION 
While Jacobs should be commended for bringing a different research method to this subject, 
his investigation suffers from a number of limitations:' 
1) Can the relationship Jacobs finds between income inequality and imprisonment ratios for 
larceny and burglary be generalized to other offenses? Jacobs argues that "because survey 
evidence invariably indicates that the poor are much more likely to be victims of crimes of 
1. Because my critique of Jacobs' study is primarily methodological in nature, the reader is referred to his ar- 
ticle for a brief examination of the conflict perspective of the legal order and the theoretical basis of our two 
investigations. 
violence, the association between inequality and the imprisonment ratios for these crimes should 
be noticeably weaker" (1978:516). He fails, however, to test this assertion by considering violent 
crimes. To address this question, I applied Jacobs' model to (1) two violent crimes, murder and 
assault; (2) one additional property crime, auto theft; and (3) robbery, which may be considered 
either a property or a violent crime. 
2) Jacobs used the Gini coefficient of income inequality as a measure of economic inequality, 
but he did not simultaneously consider race as an additional dimension of inequality. He in- 
dicates that he considered race in his model, but that "variables like percent non-white are too 
collinear with the index of inequality to be used in the same equation (r = .78)." In addition, 
Jacobs reports that, when he substituted percent non-white population for the inequality 
variable, "the index of inequality does better when independent variables are ranked according to 
the strength of their coefficients." Thus, he concludes, "the racial aspect of inequality is not a 
very important determinant of the imprisonment ratios" (1978:520). While this may be correct, 
Jacobs' conclusion about the relative importance of race and income inequality on imprisonment 
cannot be drawn from his analysis. The correlation of r = .78 (r2 = .61) does not provide suffi- 
cient evidence that income inequality and non-white population cannot both be entered into the 
same equation due to collinearity. On the contrary, a sizable proportion of the variation - nearly 
40 percent -in either of these variables cannot be accounted for by the other. In addition, 
because Jacobs did not simultaneously consider both income inequality and race in his analysis, 
his findings cannot support the claim that income inequality is a more important determinant of 
imprisonment. To remedy this situation, I consider both variables simultaneously. 
3) Jacobs recognizes that four other factors may influence variations in imprisonment ratios: 
(1) It may be more difficult to apprehend offenders in large cities where social control is more dif- 
ficult. (2) Imprisonments may be higher where there is a higher proportion of law enforcement 
officers. (3) More resources may be applied to crime control where there is a larger tax base. (4) 
Social control is likely to be more difficult where immigration has been high. To these four 
variables I would add a fifth consideration that has received some attention in the recent general 
deterrence literature-the influence of crime rates on the certainty of legal sanctions, including 
imprisonment (Ehrlich, 1973, 1975; Fisher and Nagin, 1978; Logan, 1972, 1975; Nagin, 1978). 
Not only may the certainty of arrest, conviction, and imprisonment influence crime rates (deter- 
rence), but the level of crime may also influence the level of arrests, convictions, and im- 
prisonments due to "system overload." Indeed, some recent investigations have found the inverse 
relationship between the certainty of legal sanctions and crime rates is due more to the effect of 
crime rates on the certainty of arrest and imprisonment than the effect of the certainty of arrest 
and imprisonment on offense rates (Logan, 1975; Nagin, 1978). To consider this reciprocal rela- 
tionship, I introduced the index crime rate for year t-1 (1959) as an additional control variable in 
the analysis.2 
4) When Jacobs considered only non-southern states (n = 35) he did not find a significant 
positive relationship between income inequality and imprisonment for burglary. He attributes 
this to the fact that in non-southern states, victim survey data do not show victims of burglary to 
be at higher income levels. In contrast, in southern states, victims of burglary are at higher in- 
come levels. Accordingly, Jacobs argues that the relationship between income inequality and 
2. The crime rate measure used is the total number of the following types of offenses per 100,000 popula- 
tion: murder, assault, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. Note that I have used the 
index crime rate lagged by one year (t-1) in examining the effect of crime on imprisonment ratios. Had I con- 
sidered crime rates and imprisonment ratios in the same year, I would have encountered the as-yet- 
unresolved methodological difficulty of separating the deterrent effect of the certainty of imprisonment on 
offense rates from the effect of crime rates on imprisonment ratios (Greenberg et al., 1980; Logan, 1975; 
Nagin, 1978). 
burglary imprisonment ratios would differ for the two regions of the country. Jacobs' conclusion 
may be correct, but the method he uses to test this question is inefficient, and possibly 
misleading. To illustrate: He first examined 47 states and then repeated the analysis, excluding 12 
southern jurisdictions. This control procedure does remove southern states, but it also results in 
substantial loss of degrees of freedom (n = 35). As well, by excluding southern states from the 
subsequent analysis, it remains unclear to what extent Jacobs' new findings are a result of: (1) a 
different form of the relationship between income inequality and imprisonment ratios in the two 
regions of the country; and (2) examining different ranges in the inequality, imprisonment, and 
control variables for southern and non-southern states. To address these questions more effi- 
ciently, Jacobs should have (1) computed a regional dummy variable in which non-southern and 
southern states are differentiated by a 0/1 weighting; (2) multiplied the region and income in- 
equality (Gini) values to form an interaction variable; and (3) introduced this computed variable 
into the multivariate analysis to determine if there is a significant interaction between income in- 
equality and region. This is the procedure I have used to extend Jacobs' analysis. 
While part of my investigation is exploratory, I advance the following working hypotheses: 
First, consistent with Jacobs' findings and the conflict model, I expect a significant positive rela- 
tionship between income inequality (and non-white population) and certainty of imprisonment 
for each index crime. Second, for the same reasons Jacobs suggests, I predict imprisonment ratios 
to be (1) positively related to police per capita and mean income (a proxy variable for resources 
available for crime control); and (2) negatively related to the proportion of state residents living 
in large cities and percent change in population for the last 10-year period. Third, if the level of 
crime does affect the ability of the criminal justice system to effectively deal with crime ("system 
overload"), I expect a significant negative relationship between crime rates (for year t-1) and im- 
prisonment ratios (for year t). Fourth, if there are differences between southern and non- 
southern states in patterns of victimization that influence the hypothesized relationship between 
income inequality and imprisonment ratios, then the region-income inequality interaction 
variable should provide a better predictor of imprisonment ratios than simply income inequality. 
METHOD 
To extend Jacobs' analysis, data were required for imprisonment ratios, income inequality, and 
the control variables. As in Jacobs' study, I computed imprisonment ratios by dividing the 
number of prison admissions for each crime by the number of crimes known to the police. Im- 
prisonment and offense data were taken from figures issued by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, respectively.3 
The income inequality measure used here is the conventional Gini coefficient which assesses in- 
come disparity/concentration in each state. Gini values for 1960 came from figures reported by 
Janish and Kau (1973). Data for the control variables came from figures issued by the following 
offices of the U.S. Department of Commerce: per capita income data from the Office of Business 
Economics (1966), and data on state population living in places of 50,000 or more, percent 
change in state population during the previous 10-year period, percent non-white population, and 
police per capita figures from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1961, 1964).4 Crime rate data for 
3. Due to missing imprisonment data for 1960 for Alaska and Hawaii, these two states were excluded from 
the analysis. Although not a state, the District of Columbia was included as an additional jurisdiction in the 
analysis. 
4. Whereas Jacobs used mean personal income data computed from Internal Revenue statistics as his income 
measure, I use per capita income figures. Because both mean personal income and per capita income can be 
considered to be reasonable proxy variables for the level of resources that states apply to crime control, I see 
no a priori reason why either of these variables would be preferable. I chose the per capita income measure 
solely because these data were readily available in Department of Commerce publications. 
major felonies for year t-1 (1959) were taken from Federal Bureau of Investigation's (1959, 1960) 
Uniform Crime Reports. A regional variable divided states into southern (value = 1) and non- 
southern (value = 0) jurisdictions.5 Finally, a region --income inequality interaction variable was 
computed by multiplying the values for the Gini coefficient and the regional dummy variable. 
The analysis proceeded through a series of multiple regressions. First, I examined Jacobs' 
model of imprisonment for each index offense (Model I). Second, I repeated the analysis in- 
cluding the region-income inequality interaction variable (Model II).6 Third, I examined Jacobs' 
model further by adding the index crime rate for year t-1 and non-white population as control 
variables (Model III). 
FINDINGS 
Table 1 shows the results of the analysis for each of the three models. I expected a significant 
positive relationship between income inequality and imprisonment ratios but this is only partially 
borne out for Model I. The beta coefficients are positive for burglary and larceny and auto theft, 
but only for burglary is the relationship statistically significant. For larceny, the largest beta is for 
income inequality, but this coefficient is not significant at P < .05. In contrast, two variables are 
better predictors of imprisonment for auto theft, with the coefficient being positive (as expected) 
and statistically significant for the resource level variable. 
Jacobs argues that, because the victims and offenders of violent crimes are more economically 
similar than their counterparts for property crimes, the positive relationship between income ine- 
quality and imprisonment ratios for violent crimes should be weaker. Model I does not support 
this prediction for murder and assault, nor for robbery which may also be considered a crime 
against persons. On the contrary, for these three offenses there is an inverse relationship between 
income inequality and imprisonment ratios. Although these negative coefficients are not 
statistically significant, they do not provide support for the conflict model. 
For Model II, where a region-income inequality variable is considered, the findings are again 
mixed.7 For each property crime (including robbery), the interaction variable is positively 
5. The following 17 jurisdictions are classified by the Bureau of Census as southern: Alabama, Arkansas, 
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia. 
6. Strictly speaking, multiple regression requires that the independent variables entered into a regression 
equation be orthogonal (independent). Seldom, if ever, however, is this assumption strictly met in actual 
research applications, with multiple regression proving to be quite robust even when independent variables 
are highly correlated (Farrar and Glauber,1967; Haitovsky, 1969). To determine if income inequality and 
percent non-white population are too collinear (dependent) to be entered into the same regression equation, a 
series of auxiliary regressions were performed. First, to remove the effect of race (non-white population) 
from income inequality (Gini values), income inequality was regressed against non-white population and 
residual Gini values were computed. This procedure made non-white population and income inequality in- 
dependent (r = -.002) from one another. Second, the residual Gini values were substituted for the original 
Gini values in the regressions for each offense. The assumption behind this procedure is that, if income in- 
equality (apart from race) is a significant predictor of imprisonment ratios, then removing the effect of race 
from inequality should not alter Jacobs' findings. Hence, as Jacobs interprets the conflict model, it is income 
inequality and not race that affects imprisonment ratios. This procedure produced results consistent with the 
findings reported in Tables 1 and 2 for both income inequality and non-white population and the other in- 
dependent variables. Thus, I conclude that non-white population and income inequality are not too collinear 
to be entered in the same equation. 
7. For Model II (and Model III), where the possible interaction effect between region and income inequality 
is considered, standardized coefficients are reported for (1) the interaction variable, (2) southern states, and 
(3) non-southern states. Because the region variable differentiates non-southern and southern states by a 0/1 
weighting respectively, a positive sign for the coefficients for the interaction variable indicates that there is a 
more substantial relationship between income inequality and imprisonment ratios in southern jurisdictions. 
Conversely, if the coefficients are negative for the interaction variable, the relationship between income in- 
equality and imprisonment ratios is more substantial in non-southern states. For each region, the coefficients 
indicate the direction and the magnitude of the relationship between income inequality and imprisonment 
ratios. 
TABLE 1 
Multiple Regression Results for Three Models of 
Imprisonment Ratios for Six Index Offenses, 1960 
Auto 
Independent Variables Murder Assault Robbery Burglary Larceny Theft 
MODEL I 
Economic Inequality (Gini) -.180 -.123 - .023 .458a .385 .217 
Percent Residents of Large Cities -.249 -.432 -.428 -.516a -.166 -.267 
Percent Change in Population -.104 -.145 -.158 -.123 -.122 -.010 
Police Per Capita -.176 .028 .056 .177 .194 -.214 
Resource Level (Per Capita Income) .183 .111 .092 -.030 -.247 .717a 
R2 .147 .169 .152 .477c .363b .125 
MODEL II 
Economic Inequality & Region -.115 -.227 .310 .514a .500a .003 
Southern States -.194 -.153 .018 .526 .451 .217 
Non-Southern States -.079 .074 -.292 .012 -.049 .214 
Percent Residents of Large Cities -.248 -.430 -.430 - .519a -.169 -.267 
Percent Change in Population -.010 -.137 -.171 -.142 -.141 -.010 
Police Per Capita - .163 .053 .021 .118 .138 - .215 
Resource Level (Per Capita Income) .181 .106 .098 -.020 -.237 .717a 
R2 .150 .183 .179 .552c .433c .125 
MODEL III 
Economic Inequality & Region -.164 -.236 .242 .367 .532a -.158 
Southern States -.045 -.107 .145 .339 .537 .107 
Non-Southern States .119 .129 - .097 - .028 .005 .265 
Percent Residents of Large Cities -.097 -.391 -.269 - .461a -.153 -.145 
Percent Change in Population .256 -.046 .215 .046 -.119 .326 
Police Per Capita .101 .126 .281 .074 .207 -.139 
Resource Level (Per Capital Income) .179 .104 .102 .029 -.252 .763a 
Percent Non-White Population -.065 -.026 -.027 .289 -.096 .246 
Index Crime Rate, 1959 - .634a - .162 - .680a -.300 -.050 -.567 
R2 .241 .189 .284 .594c .436b .216 
Significance Levels: a = P< .05; b = P< .01; c = P< .001. 
associated with imprisonment ratios, and the betas are statistically significant for burglary and 
larceny. For burglary there is a moderate to strong relationship between income inequality and 
imprisonment for southern states (.526), and only a slight association (.012) for non-southern 
states. Similarly, for larceny there is a moderate relationship between income inequality and im- 
prisonment for southern states (.451), and a slight negative association for non-southern jurisdic- 
tions (-.049). Comparison of the betas show that the region-income inequality variable is the 
best predictor of imprisonment for larceny, and the second best predictor (behind the percentage 
of residents living in large cities) for burglary. 
For the remaining offenses there is no consistent pattern of regional effects upon the relation- 
ship between income inequality and imprisonment. For auto theft there is a slight positive rela- 
tionship between income inequality and the dependent variable for both southern (.217) and non- 
southern states (.214), whereas for murder, income inequality and imprisonment ratios are 
negatively associated for southern (- .194) and non-southern (- .079) jurisdictions. Finally, for 
assault there is a slight negative relationship between income inequality and imprisonment for 
southern states (and a slight positive relationship between these two factors in non-southern 
states), but this pattern is reversed for robbery. 
For Model III, where the index crime rate for 1959 and percent non-white population are in- 
troduced as control variables, the findings are also mixed, and even more unfavorable for the 
conflict hypothesis. For larceny, there remains a significant interaction effect between region and 
income inequality, with income inequality being a much better predictor of imprisonment in 
 southern (.537) than non-southern (.005) states. Unlike Model II, however, the index crime rate 
for 1959 and percent non-white population reduced to insignificance the interaction effect be- 
tween region and income inequality for burglary. As in Models I and II, only the percentage of 
state residents living in large cities is a significant predictor of imprisonments for this offense. 
As with Model II, the effect of region on the relationship between income inequality and im- 
prisonment is mixed for the other offenses. For southern states, there is a slight positive relation- 
ship between income inequality and imprisonment for robbery and auto theft, but a slight 
negative relationship between these two variables for murder and assault. In contrast, and with 
the exception of robbery, there is a low positive relationship between income inequality and im- 
prisonment for murder, assault, and auto theft for non-southern states. 
Also at odds with the conflict argument is the fact that percent non-white population (race) is 
not significantly related to imprisonment ratios for any of the six offenses. Moreover (and con- 
trary to our hypothesis), non-white population and imprisonment ratios are negatively associated 
for four offenses: murder, assault, robbery, and larceny. 
Finally, Model III provides some support for the system overload hypothesis that the level of 
crime affects the ability of the criminal justice system to effectively respond to crime. For each 
offense, the higher the index crime rate (1959), the lower the imprisonment ratio (1960). For 
murder (- .643) and robbery (- .680), these two factors are significantly related. The coefficient 
for auto theft (-.567) is also substantial, but falls short of the .05 level of significance. For 
murder and robbery, the index crime rate is the best predictor of imprisonment. For auto theft, 
this factor ranks second behind the resource level variable. In contrast, there is only a slight 
negative trade-off between the crime rate and imprisonment ratios for assault, burglary and 
larceny. 
Results For A Reduced Model 
While the above results provide only limited support for the conflict hypothesis for income in- 
equality and no support for the conflict hypothesis for race, the possibility exists that I have not 
properly specified the imprisonment rate equations. Note that some variables were not 
significantly related to imprisonment ratios for any offense for any model, while some other 
variables were significant predictors of imprisonment for only some offenses. By retaining non- 
significant variables throughout the analysis (Models I, II, and III), degrees of freedom were 
reduced, thus making it more difficult to establish a statistically significant finding for the 
variables of primary interest, income inequality, and non-white population. 
To test this question, imprisonment rates for each offense were regressed against income in- 
equality (or the region-income inequality variable) and non-white population, and any other 
variable examined in Model III that reached the .10 level of statistical significance. (A liberal .10 
level of significance was chosen because of the ratio of the number of independent variables to 
observations considered in Model III.) Accordingly, the predictor variables considered in the 
reduced models differ by offense. Results of this analysis are shown in Table 2.8 
Table 2 provides only limited support for the conflict argument. Percent non-white population 
is not a significant predictor of imprisonment for any offense: the coefficients for race are mixed 
in sign and low in magnitude. Similarly, for murder, robbery, auto theft, and assault, where in- 
come inequality is considered (rather than the interaction variable for region and income in- 
equality), the betas are mixed in sign and low in magnitude. For murder, robbery, and auto theft, 
the index crime rate is a significant predictor of imprisonment, along with the resource level 
8. In Table 2, the region-income inequality interaction variable is considered solely for burglary and larceny, 
since the results for this variable were not statistically significant (P < .10) in the earlier analysis (Model III) 
for the other offenses. 
TABLE 2 
Multiple Regression Results for Reduced Models of 
Imprisonment Ratios for Six Index Offenses, 1960 
Auto 
Independent Variables Murder Assault Robbery Burglary Larceny Theft 
Economic Inequality (Gini) -.149 .129 -.107 *** ** .132 
Percent Non-White Population -.115 -.330 .079 .302 -.188 .019 
Economic Inequality & Region *** ** ** .374 .522a 
Southern States .296 .766 
Non-Southern States -.078 .244 
Percent Residents of Large Cities *** *** * -.572c *** ** 
Resource Level (Per Capita Income) *** ** ** ** ** .516a 
Index Crime Rate, 1959 - .370a *** - .486b *** ** - .365a 
R2 .201a .066 .216a .559c .369c .137 
Significance Levels: a = P< .05; b = P< .01; c = P< .001. 
*** Variables not included in the model for the offense indicated. 
variable for auto theft. None of the independent variables are significantly related to im- 
prisonments for assault. 
For burglary and larceny, where the region-income inequality variable was examined, the find- 
ings closely parallel the earlier results (Model III). For larceny, there is a significant interaction ef- 
fect between region and income inequality, with income inequality a better predictor of imprison- 
ment for southern (.766) than non-southern (.244) states. This finding is consistent with Jacobs' 
early study. In contrast, the reduced model fails to show a significant interaction effect at the .05 
level between region and income inequality for burglary. Note, however, that income inequality is 
positively associated with imprisonment ratios for southern states (.296), and negatively 
associated with imprisonments for non-southern states (-.078). 
To sum up, the above analysis (Tables 1 and 2) reveals a generally stable pattern of findings for 
the conflict hypothesis. First, for none of the six offenses is race (non-white population) a signifi- 
cant predictor of levels of imprisonment. Second, with the exception of larceny, income inequal- 
ity is also not a significant predictor of levels of imprisonment. Even for larceny, however, there 
is not a direct relationship between income inequality and state imprisonment ratios. The rela- 
tionship depends upon region, with income inequality only predicting levels of imprisonment in 
southern states. This finding contradicts Jacobs' argument that income inequality should have a 
relatively uniform effect on imprisonment hroughout the states since the "affluent are evidently 
the most frequent victims of larceny in all regions of the country" (1978:521). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This investigation extends the scope of Jacobs' (1978) study. From a cross-sectional analysis of 
states for 1960, Jacobs finds that income inequality is a significant determinant of imprisonment 
ratios for burglary and larceny, and concludes that "conflict theory does predict outcomes in the 
criminal justice system when property is at stake" (1978:523). Jacobs contends that these findings 
challenge Chirico's and Waldo's (1975:769) assertion that the available evidence consistently fails 
to support the expectations of conflict theorists with regard to the sanctioning power of the state. 
Jacobs' study suffers from a number of limitations, however, and my replication and extension of 
his analysis does not support the conflict hypothesis for either crimes against persons or property. 
In summary, these are my findings: 
1) There is a slight negative relationship between income inequality and imprisonment ratios 
for murder and robbery, and a slight positive relationship between income inequality and im- 
prisonment ratios for assault and auto theft. For none of these offenses are the results statistically 
significant, nor is there any evidence of a significant interaction effect between region and income 
inequality and imprisonment ratios for these offenses. 
2) For burglary and larceny, there is a more substantial relationship between income inequality 
and imprisonment ratios, but this relationship depends upon region. For both offenses, income 
inequality is a better predictor of levels of imprisonment for southern than non-southern states. 
The interaction effect between income inequality and region is statistically significant for larceny. 
3) Non-white population (race) is negatively associated with imprisonment ratios for murder, 
assault, and larceny, and positively associated with levels of imprisonment for robbery, burglary, 
and auto theft. Regardless of their sign, however, the coefficients for non-white population are 
low in magnitude and are not statistically significant. 
This analysis provides no support for the conflict hypothesis, with the exception of the signifi- 
cant (P < .05) positive relationship between income inequality and imprisonment for larceny. 
Even this relationship, however, depends on region, with income inequality being a better predic- 
tor of imprisonment for southern (beta = .766) than non-southern (beta = .244) states. In other 
words, it would appear that the conflict hypothesis for income inequality only holds for larceny 
for southern states.9 
I can provide no satisfactory explanation for this finding, but offer two possible hypotheses: 
1) If "economic advantage and power only predict imprisonment ratios for a crime of which a 
disproportionate number of victims are affluent" (Jacobs, 1978:522), then my contradictory find- 
ings for larceny for southern and non-southern states may be a result of a different pattern of vic- 
timization of the affluent in the two regions of the country. That is, the affluent may be more 
likely victims of larceny in southern states. This hypothesis is not borne out by the victimization 
data that Jacobs reports (1978:521). On the contrary, the proportion of people with incomes 
above $10,000 in 1966 that were victims of larceny was 18.3 percent in southern states and 19.2 
percent in non-southern states. Similarly, the proportion of people in the second-highest income 
category ($6,000-9,999) that were victims of larceny was 12.0 percent in southern states and 16.0 
percent in non-southern states. While these percentage differences are not large, if anything 
Jacobs' argument would lead us to expect income inequality to be a better predictor of imprison- 
ment for larceny in non-southern jurisdictions. 
2) There may be a non-linear relationship between income inequality and imprisonment for 
larceny, with this relationship being qualitatively different for the two regions. Specifically, in- 
come inequality may have to reach a certain level - a "tipping point" - before it has a significant 
effect on imprisonment ratios, and this point may be reached in southern, but not in non- 
southern, states. 
To explore this possibility, I examined the level of income inequality for the two regions of the 
country. For non-southern states, the Gini coefficients range from .312 to .391, with a mean 
value of .346. For southern states, the Gini coefficients range from .349 to .466, with a mean 
value of .410. These Gini values indicate that not only is the range of income inequality greater in 
southern (. 117) than non-southern (.079) states, but that the absolute level of income inequality is 
greater in southern states. 
This regional pattern may possibly account for the fact that income inequality is a better 
predictor of imprisonment for larceny in southern states. Support for this interpretation is pro- 
vided by Jacobs' argument that "the more there are differences in economic resources and 
9. Note that these findings are not unique to 1960. Rather, a replication of the analysis for 1964 also shows a 
significant (P < .01) positive relationship between income inequality and the imprisonment ratio for larceny, 
with the association between these two variables being more substantial in southern (beta = .387) than non- 
southern (beta = .049) states. Also, as in 1960 income inequality is not a significant predictor of imprison- 
ment ratios for the remaining index offenses for 1964. Nor is non-white population significantly related to 
imprisonment for any offense. Results of the 1964 analysis are available from the author upon request. 
economic power, the more one can expect that the criminal codes will be administered in a way 
that pleases monied elites," and "one major guarantee of the supremacy of an economic elite is 
property" (1978:516). If this interpretation is correct, however, one must ask why income in- 
equality only significantly predicts imprisonments for larceny in southern states. Are not 
burglary, auto theft, and robbery (and possibly even murder and assault) also threats to the in- 
terests of the monied elite in southern states? 
My analysis suggests the answer to this question is negative. For no crime against property 
other than larceny is there a significant interaction effect between income inequality and region 
on imprisonment ratios. If anything, one would expect such a finding for burglary, since those at 
high income levels (above $10,000) are more likely to be victims of this offense in southern (8.5 
percent) than non-southern (6.6 percent) states (Jacobs, 1978:521). This prediction, however, is 
not borne out by the regression analysis. 
Contrary to the conflict hypothesis and Jacobs' argument, and whereas the more affluent in 
the South have a higher victimization rate for burglary than their non-southern counterparts, in- 
come inequality is not a significant predictor of imprisonment for burglary in southern states. 
Conversely, whereas the more affluent in the South have a lower victimization rate for larceny 
than their non-southern counterparts, income inequality is a significant predictor of imprison- 
ment for larceny in southern states. Unfortunately, adequate data are not available for the period 
under study to examine regional patterns of victimization by income for the remaining crimes 
against property and persons considered in the analysis (Ennis, 1967). However, this is probably 
not an important consideration since there is no evidence of a significant interaction effect be- 
tween region and income inequality on imprisonment ratios for these offenses. 
I can provide no adequate explanation of why the relationship between income inequality and 
imprisonment for larceny is conditioned by region, with inequality only being a good predictor of 
imprisonment in the South. What is clear, however, is that this regional difference is not a result 
of lower rates of victimization for larceny of the affluent in non-southern states. Nor would this 
finding appear to be a result of a general southern response to property crimes and inequality, 
since this regional pattern is unique to larceny. 
The evidence presented in this analysis for both race and income inequality overwhelmingly 
refutes Jacobs' argument that "conflict theory does predict outcomes in the criminal justice 
system when property is at stake." I agree with Jacobs, however, that "it would be naive to expect 
that the evidence from any single research design can settle the dispute between conflict and con- 
sensus theorists" (1978:523). This is certainly true of his study, and is no less the case with mine. I 
must, however, take strong issue with Jacobs' claim that his research successfully challenges - at 
least for property crimes - critics of the conflict hypothesis. Rather, the support that Jacobs 
reports for the conflict hypothesis would appear to be a consequence of the theoretical and 
methodological shortcomings of his analysis. 
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